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The Use of Force and (the State of)
Necessity
Andreas Laursen*
ABSTRACT

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, debates about
international law and the use of force have gained new
momentum. This is due to the armed conflicts in Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq as well as the publication of two recent
security strategies by the U.S. government. These strategies
consider the possibility of preemptive use of force and have
received considerable criticism from internationallaw scholars.
Professor Laursen asks whether the necessity excuse in
international law allows for preemptive strikes of the sort
envisioned by the U.S. security strategies. Following an
examination of the status of the necessity excuse in international
law, which finds that necessity is a legitimate part of current
internationallaw and under certain circumstances provides an
excuse for a state's breach of its obligations, Professor Laursen
analyzes whether the necessity excuse may be invoked in the
context of the use of force. He concludes that the necessity excuse
is not normally available in the case of use of force against
"traditional"terrorism. With regard to "new" terrorism, the
excuse may be appropriate,but the central issue of "imminence"
will remainproblematic when consideringpreemptive strikes.
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A strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but not the highest. The laws
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when
in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the
law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to
the means.
1
Thomas Jefferson
Not kennt kein Gebot! (necessity knows no law)
2
von Bethmann-Hollweg

1.
Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force
in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern World, in DECEPTION AND
DETERRENCE IN "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION," STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND
OTHER FORMS OF SECRET WARFARE 196 (John Norton Moore ed., 1997).
2.
Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 13, 38 n.l0, Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7; see also BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK,
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 (1928) (German Chancellor in
speech to German Reichstag August 4, 1914 justifying occupation of Belgium and

Luxembourg in order to forestall alleged attack by France against Germany through
Belgium and Luxembourg). Also see the editorial comment in the American Journal of
InternationalLaw: "It therefore appears that the Chancellor knew and admitted that the
occupation of Belgium and Luxemburg was contrary to international law, but he justified
the act by the statement that the German Empire was 'in a state of necessity' and that
'necessity knows no law."' Editorial Comment, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 877, 880 (1914); see also
Jules Basdevant, Not kennt Kein Gebot: Die Theorie des Notrechtes und die Ereignisse
unserer Zeit 1915, Rigles Ggngrales du Droit de la Paix, 58 RC 1936-IV 473, 551-52
(describing the episode as one of 'strategic convenience' and not necessity).
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To say that a power is necessary, that it logically results
from a certain situation, is to admit the non-existence of any
legal justification. Necessity knows no law, it is said; and
indeed to invoke necessity is to step outside the law.
3
Judge Gros
[International law] rejects the idea that necessity knows no
law.
4
Oscar Schachter

I. INTRODUCTION

Writing in 1986, the distinguished British professor Brownlie
lamented that "the use of force is a subject younger lawyers tend to
avoid these days."'5 Brownlie found that in the 1980s, human rights
and the protection of the environment attracted greater attention in
spite of the fact that, according to Brownlie, the main threats to
human rights and the environment came inter alia from the use of
force by states. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, debates
about international law and the use of force have gained new
momentum. Spurred on by the end of the Cold War as well as the
armed conflicts in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003),
in addition to the publication of the two recent security strategies by
the U.S. government,6 international legal scholarship has seen
nothing if not an overwhelming resurgence of interest in the
regulation of the use of force.
Among the more controversial concepts to involve the agora of
international legal minds is the theory of pre-emptive use of force.
Although some argue that the seeds of the strategy of pre-emptive

3.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971
I.C.J. 16, 339 (June 21) (Gros, J., dissenting).
4.

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 173

(1991).
5.
Ian Brownlie, The United Nations Charterand the Use of Force, 1945-1985
in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 491 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
6.
National
Security
Strategy
(Sept.
2002),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); National Security
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Dec. 2002) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2004). The two Strategies may by themselves be seen "in the tradition of an older
debate which received new impetus after the end of the East-West conflict," i.e. the
Cold War. Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 227, 229-40 (2003).
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7
force may be found in the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance,"
President Bush first announced the idea when he told graduates at
West Point Military Academy, "[O]ur security will require all
Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for
preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend
our lives."8 The President's thoughts have now been codified in the
National Security Strategy (NSS):

We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by . . . identifying
and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders . . . we will not
hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense
by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from
9
doing harm against our people and our country.

As is clear from the text just quoted, the drafters of the NSS
document perceive "acting preemptively" as being within "our right of
self-defense." The legal side of the argument is subsequently
elaborated upon.
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most
often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing
to attack. 10

7.
According to the program Frontline from Public Broadcasting Service,
"[p]olicy analysts note that there are many elements in the 2002 NSS [National
Security Strategy] document which bear a strong resemblance to recommendations
presented in Paul Wolfowitz's controversial Defense Planning Guidance draft written
in 1992 under the first Bush administration," including the ideas that containment was
a relic of the Cold War and the need to use military force to preempt provocations from
rogue states with weapons of mass destruction. Frontline: The Gulf War's Ragged
Ending; U.S. Decides on Containment Policy for Iraq, (PBS television broadcast, Feb.
28,
1991), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/
cron.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). On the controversy caused by Wolfowitz's initial
draft, see Patrick E. Tyler, Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1992, at A14.
8.
Press Release, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point
(June 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020601-3.html (last visited June 13, 2003).
9.
National
Security
Strategy,
6
(Sept.
2002),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nss2.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). The National
Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction similarly states that U.S.
military forces must have the capability to defend against WMD [Weapons of Mass
Destruction] armed adversaries, including "in appropriate cases through preemptive
measures." National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra
note 6, at 3.
10.
National Security
Strategy,
15
(Sept.
2002),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nss5.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
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Here the NSS document finds that anticipatory self-defense is
permissible in international law, which is generally a fair statement,
even if not all international law scholars agree. There is, however, a
problem of "imminence," which also may be seen as the
distinguishing point between anticipatory self-defense and a
preemptive strike, although the NSS document conflates the two
concepts. Thus, the document continues, "We must adapt the concept
of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's
adversaries." 11 The document goes on to describe the new threats,
concluding, "[Iln an age where the enemies of civilization openly and
actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United
States cannot remain idle while dangers gather."'1 2 Presidential
spokesman Ari Fleischer put it as follows,
Preemptive doctrine, of course, as laid out by the President at West
Point and as expounded upon by the Vice President yesterday, says
that time is not on America's side. We don't have time to wait for them
to develop these weapons and attack us without any warning. And
therefore, the doctrine of preemption, as the President laid it out, is a
way to continue America's efforts to promote peace around the world by
13
denying them the ability to inflict damage on us.

It may be posited that this is the crux of the matter: The U.S.
efforts to broaden the concept of "imminence" are the central legal
issue in the new strategy of preemptive use of force. This is what
causes some legal scholars to object to the NSS strategy, "De lege lata,
however, the expansion of the right of anticipatory self-defence
proposed in the National Security Strategy is not acceptable."'1 4 It is
probably fair to assert that the majority of scholars agree with this
statement by Bothe. 15 Among the voices of concern is that of the
Secretary General of the United Nations, who on September 23, 2003
declared that the logic of using force preemptively "represents a
fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however
imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty6
eight years.'

11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Press Release, Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer, Crawford Elementary
School, Crawford, Texas, (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/O8/20020827.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002).
14.
Bothe, supra note 6, at 232.
15.
See, for example, Kirgis' brief comment that if the new U.S. policy reserves
the right to act in self-defense even when the terrorist threat is not imminent, the
Caroline test-and thus the test under Article 51-would not be met. Frederic L.
Kirgis, Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism, ASIL INSIGHTS 1-2 (June 2002),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh88.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
16.
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address to the General Assembly,
New York (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statementsl
g2eng030923.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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This conclusion raises- a number of questions. At a theoretical
level, one may consider how the U.S. claims affect the development of
international law. Is it advisable to allow for the proposed broadening
of the concept of "imminence?" Or is this a dangerous development for
international law and society? At a more practical level, it might be
asked how the United States would justify a preemptive use of force
in a situation where the use of force was found necessary. Put
another way: Is the preemptive use of force only legally conceivable
under the NSS documents self-defense rubric, which- is generally
considered to be at odds with international law? Or does international
law already provide a more suitable excuse for the use of force in
exceptional circumstances? It is suggested that a defense for the use
of force might be found in the necessity excuse.
Part II of the present Article sets out the very substantial work
on the necessity excuse, which has been carried out the International
Law Commission (ILC). Part III examines the opinions of
international judicial bodies, of states, and of international legal
scholars. Part IV examines the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and analyzes the
cumulative conditions of the necessity excuse. Part V addresses the
controversial issue of the possibility of excusing the use of force by
reference to necessity. This leads to a more specific examination of
use of force against terrorism and the necessity excuse. Based on this
study, it is concluded that the necessity excuse is not normally
available in the case of use of force against "traditional" terrorism.
With regard to the "new" terrorism, including terrorism employing
weapons of mass destruction, the necessity excuse may be
appropriate but the issue of imminence will continue to cause
problems in considering preemptive strikes.

II. THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw COMMISSION
Necessity in international law may provide an excuse for a
state's breach of its obligation or, in other words, the state of
necessity may be a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in the
parlance of state responsibility. Throughout the years, necessity has
been a controversial and contested concept. It has, however, not
attracted much academic examination in its own right. Writing in
1928, in what would seem to be the most recent monograph on the
topic, Rodick could not find any earlier attempts to deal critically

2004]

NECESSITY DEFENSE

with the doctrine of necessity in international law. 17 All this may
soon change, though, now that the latest and last Special Rapporteur,
James Crawford, has "rescued" the topic of state responsibility.18 In
addition to the work of the ILC, a recent judgment of the ICJ
dispelled any doubt about whether the necessity excuse exists in
international law. In 1997, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case,
the ICJ held that "the state of necessity is a ground recognized by
customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act
not in conformity with an international obligation."' 19
This section will examine the legal development relating to the
status of necessity in international law, specifically the relationship
between necessity and the use of force. First, the work at the ILC will
be outlined because the most concerted discussions on the issue have
taken place over several years under the auspices of the Commission.
After examining the treatment of the necessity excuse by various
international tribunals, in state responses to the ILC, and by
scholars, this section will set out the cumulative conditions of the
necessity defense based primarily on the ICJ's judgment in the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. Finally, it will scrutinize the
options for making a claim of necessity when using force generally
and against terrorists particularly.
Work on the codification of the international legal rules of state
20
responsibility has taken place in the ILC since its very beginning.
In 1949, state responsibility was selected as a topic suitable for
codification, and in 1953 the U.N. General Assembly (GA) requested
that the ILC proceed with the codification of the principles of

17.

BURLEIGH

CUSHING

RODICK,

THE

DOCTRINE

OF

NECESSITY

IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1928). Basdevant, however, mentions a 'c6lbre brochure' by
Kohler. Basdevant, supranote 2, at 551.
18.
Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of InternationalLaw,
29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (1988).
19.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40
51
(Sept. 25) (judgment).
20.
On the work of the ILC, see generally IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION (1987) and ARTHUR WATTS, 3 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 19491998 (1999). On the topic of state responsibility, see generally UNITED NATIONS
CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987) and 1
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSmILITY, art. 1-

35 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991). More recently on the topic of state responsibility, see
generally James Crawford et al., The ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Toward
Completion of a Second Reading, 94 AM. J. INTL L. 660 (2000); Symposium: The ILC's State
Responsibility Articles, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773 (2002); and Symposium: State Responsibility,
10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 339 (1999). On Chapter V of Part 1, see generally Jean J.A. Salmon,
Faut-ilcodifier l'etat de necessite en droit international?,in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 235 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1984) and S.P. Jagota,
State Responsibility: Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, 16 NETH. Y.B. INTL L. 249
(1985), and finally Vaughan Lowe, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for
Excuses, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 405 (1999).
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international law governing state responsibility. 21 The initial work of
the ILC and of its first Special Rapporteur Garcia Amador was partly
based on earlier deliberations under the auspices of the League of
Nations and was concentrated on the content of substantive rules of
"responsibility of the state for injuries caused in its territory to the
person or property of aliens." In his third report, Garcia Amador
discussed necessity:
It is undeniable that great uncertainty surrounds the subject of
necessity; in other words, it is a controversial question what
circumstances have to attend the imputable act or omission in order
that that state of necessity can justify full exoneration from
responsibility or extenuate responsibility for the purposes of reparation.
Nevertheless, it is precisely and principally because of this uncertainty,
and because of the contradictions encountered in diplomatic and other
documents, that necessity ought to be mentioned as a defence in the
draft. If state of necessity is recognized in international law, as in fact it
is, it needs a definition to forestall as far as possible a recurrence of
past controversies concerning the circumstances in which it is
22
admissible as a defence.

In his sixth and final report as Special Rapporteur, he included the
following paragraph 2 to Article 17:
Exonerating and extenuating circumstances:
Likewise, an act shall not be imputable to the state if it is a
consequence of a state of necessity involving grave danger and
imminent peril threatening some vital interest of the State, provided
that the State did not provoke that peril and was unable to counteract
23
it by other means and so to prevent the injury.

When Garcia-Amador, in 1961, ceased to be a member of the
Commission, a sub-committee chaired by Roberto Ago, who would
subsequently be
appointed
the
next Special Rapporteur,
recommended that priority be given to the general aspects and rules
governing the international responsibility of the state, i.e., general
secondary rules of the international law of obligations, without
neglecting the experience and material gathered, particularly
concerning responsibility for injuries to persons or property of aliens.

21.
See Request for the Codification of the Principles of International Law
Governing State Responsibility, G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/2630 (1953). For an overview of the ILC work on state responsibility, see the
ILC web-site at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/guide/9_6.htm.
22.
F.V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur, Responsibility of the State for
Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens, Part II: The
InternationalClaim, Third Report on State Responsibility, 13, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/111,
reprinted in [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 47, 53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add. 1.
23.
F.V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur, Responsibility of the State for
Injuries Caused in Its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens, Reparation of the
Injury, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/134 & Add.1 (1961),
reprinted in [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1961/Add.1.
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As Special Rapporteur, Ago submitted eight reports and an
addendum to the last report, dealing inter alia with necessity. Ago
concluded his extensive survey of necessity with the observation that
"the concept of 'state of necessity' is far too deeply rooted in the
consciousness of the members of the international community and of
individuals within States. If driven out of the door it would return
through the window, if need be in other forms."24 In 1980, draft
Article 33 was adopted by the ILC. 25 Subsequent Special
Rapporteurs, Willem Riphagen and Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, have dealt
with Parts Two (Content, forms and degrees of international
responsibility) and Three (Settlement of Disputes) of the Draft
Articles. Part One, including necessity, was only revisited by the last
Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, in 1999.26
Overall, Crawford found that concerns as to the possible abuse of
necessity had not been borne out by experience. The ILC,
furthermore, found that "on balance, State practice and judicial
decisions support the view that necessity may constitute a

Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago,
24.
53, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/318/ADD.5-7 [hereinafter
[1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 51,
Addendum to Eighth Report].
See Report of the Int'l L. Comm'n on the Work and Its Thirty-Second
25.
Session, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 26-34,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser. A/1980IAdd. 2 (Part 2) (adopting text and Articles 1-35)
[hereinafter Draft Articles I].
1. A State of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international
obligation of the State unless:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State
against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards
which the obligation existed.
2. In any case, a State of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground
for precluding wrongfulness:
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law; or
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the
possibility of invoking the State of necessity with respect to that obligation; or
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the State of
necessity.
Id. art. 33. Note that old Article 33 is embodied in the current Article 25, which has
substantially similar language. The text of current Article 25 is found infra text
accompanying note 28.
Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on State
James
26.
275-91., U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/
Responsibility, Int'l L. Comm'n, 51st Sess., at 24-33,
498/Add.2 (1999).
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circumstance precluding wrongfulness under certain very limited
conditions" and recommended retaining the content of Article 33
(eventually Article 25) with few alterations, which will be noted in the
following when examining the conditions in more detail. 27 The
Drafting Committee adopted the following new and final wording of
the article concerning necessity:
Article 25: Necessity
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or
States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international
community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.

III.

28

THE STATUS OF NECESSITY

A. InternationalDecisions Involving Necessity
As is clear from the extensive review of older practice in Ago's
Commentary, the necessity defense has a long pedigree. Of more
recent international decisions examining, in one way or another, the
necessity excuse, mention should be made of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), which, on occasion, has considered whether the
necessity defense existed in Community law. In a 1980 case
concerning the illegal sale of concrete reinforcement bars at prices

27.
Id. at 33, 291; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARY 183 14
(2002).
28.
Extract from the Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work
of its Fifty-third Session Regarding the Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm., 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at ch. 4 El, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/
texts/State responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm
(last visited
Sept.
22,
2002)
[hereinafter Draft Articles II]. The Draft Articles are also found in CRAWFORD, supra
note 27, at 178-86.
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below the minimum prices laid down in a Commission decision, the
defendants, in part, claimed that they found themselves in a state of
(financial) necessity;2 9 they found their conduct "justified by the
principle that 'necessity makes the law.' '3 0 Both the Advocate
General and the ECJ dismissed the necessity defense. This was
apparently not done because either the Advocate General or the ECJ
31
believed the necessity defense to be absent from Community law.
The court found that since none of the undertakings which complied
with the Commission decision was in danger of bankruptcy or
liquidation or their existence threatened, it was unnecessary to
"examine whether the threat of which they [had] spoken was capable
of creating a state of necessity such as to justify their conduct. '32 With
regard to one of the defendants who had made "an erroneous
evaluation of an unfavourable economic situation which was known
to all" the ECJ noted "that personal conduct does not entitle it to rely
on a state of necessity," thereby implicitly recognizing the existence of
33
the necessity defense in certain circumstances.
It may be suggested that the principles behind the necessity
excuse were accepted in the Nachfolger Navigation Case, although
necessity was not explicitly invoked. In this case, the French navy
sank a cargo ship, the Ammersee, twenty-five nautical miles off the
coast, i.e., in international waters. The ship was carrying two
hundred tons of dynamite. During a storm, the ship caught fire and
the crew abandoned ship. Although the fire subsequently appears to
have been extinguished, the French authorities destroyed the ship
because it posed a danger to shipping and to installations along the
French coast. The case before the Conseil d'Etat concerned a demand
by the owners and insurers for compensation. The French court found
that the destruction did not violate any principle of international law
because the Ammersee constituted a "grave and immediate danger" to
the safety of the French coast, French territorial waters and

29.
Joined Cases 154, 205-06, 226-28, 263-64, 78, 31, 39, 83 & 85/79, S.p.A.
Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 907, reprinted in 1981
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 613 (1981).
30.
Id. at 702 142.
31.
The Advocate General, Francesco Capotorti, outlined the criteria for the
necessity defense as: 'a grave and imminent danger which it is impossible to avoid
otherwise than by acting in a manner which, objectively considered, is unlawful.' Id. at
660
17. He further stressed that "it seems to me indisputable that extreme caution
must be exercised in interpreting the concepts, as recognition of the existence of a state
of necessity is tantamount to exempting a person from compliance with particular
obligations, which may be done only in exceptional cases." Id.
32.
Id. at 702 143.
33.
Id. at 702
144; see also Case C-235/92, Montecatini S.p.A. v. Comm'n of
the Eur. Cmtys., 1999 E.C.R. 1-4539, 1-4542 ("[]t must be stated that, although a
situation of necessity might allow conduct which would otherwise infringe Article 85(1)
[now Article 81(1)EC] of the Treaty to be considered justified, such a situation can
never result from the mere requirement to avoid financial loss.").
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navigation in these waters and "no other measure would have been
'34
sufficient to remove the danger.
In the second Rainbow Warrior case, the arbitration tribunal
touched upon the question of necessity but seemed unconvinced as to
its authority, stating that "Article 33 (now Article 25) . . . allegedly
authorizes a State to take unlawful action invoking a state of
necessity [and] refers to situations of grave and imminent danger to
the State as such and to its vital interests" but also noting that the
'3 5
content of Draft Article 33 was of "controversial character.
The LAFICO-Republic of Burundi arbitral tribunal did not wish
to express a view on the propriety of seeking to codify rules on "state
of necessity" and the adequacy of the concrete proposals made by the
'36
ILC "which [had] been a matter of debate in the doctrine.
The issue of necessity was also broached in the 1998 Fisheries
Jurisdictioncase at the ICJ.3 7 Yet, since the decision dealt with the
38
question of ICJ jurisdiction in light of a 1994 Canadian declaration,
39
the merits of the case were not discussed in detail. Canadian
authorities had, however, stated that "the arrest of the Estai was
necessary in order to put a stop to the overfishing of Greenland
halibut by Spanish fisherman" 40 and, as pointed out by Judge
Bedjaoui in his dissenting opinion, Canada had, in various fora,

34.
See Nochfolger Navigation Company Ltd. and Others, 89 INT'L L. REP. 3, 3-5
(1987).
35.
The primary proceedings connected with the Rainbow Warrior case were a
criminal case argued before the New Zealand High Court on April 22, 1985, followed by
a Report by the United Nations Secretary-General, July 6, 1986 and an implementing
agreement between France and New Zealand. Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v.
France), 74 INT'L L. REP. 241, 256, 274 (1986). The subsequent case involving the
Arbitration Tribunal concerned France's alleged breach of the implementing
agreement. Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France), 82 INT'L L. REP. 499, 554 T 78
(1990). For a brief discussion of the case, see generally Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand
v. France), 82 INT'L L. REP. 499 and Micahel Pugh, Legal Aspects of the Rainbow
Warrior Affair, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 655 (1987). See generally Jodi Wexler, The
Rainbow Warrior Affair.- State and Agent Responsibility for Authorized Violations of
InternationalLaw, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 389 (1987).
36.
Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) and The Republic of
Burundi, 96 INT'L L. REP. 282, 318-19 (1991).
37.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4).
38.
On May 10, 1994, Canada amended its acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction by submitting a new declaration of acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. See id. at 438.
39.
Some judges, however, could not help but hint at the real issue:
Was there really no other way than to embarrass the Court, which clearly
discerns illegality in Canada's conduct on the high seas, but must nonetheless
play Pontius Pilate and wash its hands of the case? This is an unwelcome
situation for a Court which knows that it must render justice but cannot do so.
Id. at 537-38 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
40.
Id. at 443.
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invoked "emergency" or even a "state of necessity."' 41 Academic
writers have debated the merits of the Canadian case and although
they disagree as to whether Canada could reasonably have claimed
necessity, they appear to agree that the necessity defense does
42
exist.
Finally, the necessity defense was recently claimed by Guinea in
a case before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.4 3 The
facts of the case are as follows: An oil tanker, the M/V Saiga, flying
the flag of St. Vincent and the Grenadines supplied oil to some fishing
vessels in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Guinea. 44 The Saiga was
arrested by Guinean customs patrol boats and brought into the port
of Guinea. Guinea justifies this action by maintaining that the
prohibition in Article 1 of Law L/94/007 "can be applied for the
purpose of controlling and suppressing the sale of gas oil to fishing
vessels in the customs radius according to Article 34 of the Customs
Code of Guinea. '4 5 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, on the other
hand, claimed that, "in applying its customs laws to the Saiga in its
customs radius, which includes parts of the exclusive economic zone,
Guinea acted contrary to the Convention. '4 6 The tribunal agreed with
St. Vincent and the Grenadines and found that "the Convention does
not empower a coastal State to apply its customs laws in respect of
any other parts of the exclusive economic zone not mentioned
above. '4 7 It remained, however, for the tribunal to consider "whether
the otherwise wrongful application by Guinea of its customs laws to
the exclusive economic zone [could] be justified under general

41.
Id. at 518, 539. Among these fora was a background paper entitled
"Backgrounder: Greenland Halibut" in which the Canadian government argued that it
had "a legal right to take action against the Spanish [which had been] established
under the doctrine of necessity." Peter G.G. Davies, The EC/Canadian Fisheries
Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 917, 936 (1995).
42.
See, e.g., Okon Akiba, International Law of the Sea: The Legality of
Canadian Seizure of the Spanish Trawler (Estai), 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 809 (1997).

Akiba concludes that "all the particularly strict conditions for a genuine plea of
necessity were in existence when Canada arrested the Spanish vessel Estai." Id. at
826. Contrary to Akiba's conclusion, Schaefer finds that the assertion that Canada
fulfilled the conditions required for claiming necessity "would not likely wash" for a
number of reasons, the immediate one being that "Canada in fact helped cause the
threat [to the essential interest]." Andrew Schaefer, 1995 Canada-Spain Fishing
Dispute (the Turbot War), 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 447 (1996). Similarly,
Davies points out that the Canadian authorities previously had tolerated overfishing
by Canadian fishermen and concludes that it is "certainly debatable" whether
circumstances of the case justified the invocation of necessity. Peter G.G. Davies, The
EC/CanadianFisheriesDispute in the Northwest Atlantic, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 917,
937 (1995).
43.
The MIV "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323
(1999).
44.
For a summary of the facts and the case, see id. at 1335-36.
45.
Id. at 1349 116.
46.
Id. at 1350 123.
47.

Id. at 1350-51

127.
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international law by Guinea's appeal to 'state of necessity.' 48 After
making reference to the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project case and the
criteria set out therein, the tribunal concluded,
[N]o evidence has been produced by Guinea to show that its essential
interests were in grave and imminent peril. But, however essential
Guinea's interest in maximizing its tax revenue from the sale of gas oil
to fishing vessels, it cannot be suggested that the only means of
safeguarding that interest was to extend its customs laws to parts of
49
the exclusive economic zone.

B. States
In the context of the British intervention in Egypt in 1956 in
connection with the Suez Crisis, the then legal advisor to the British
Foreign Office and member of the ILC, later Judge at the ICJ, Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice described the doctrine of so-called necessity as a
"rather back-handed doctrine, since it is founded on the maxim that
necessity knows no law, but one to which international law does,
nevertheless, within pretty stringent limits, afford recognition." 50
States have, in their responses to the ILC, exhibited some
ambivalence toward the concept of a state of necessity. Mongolia held
that the criterion "essential interest" used in the article "not only fails
to solve the problem, but may even create new problems. '51 Sweden
found that the limitations on the invocation of necessity were "rather
vague." 2 Czechoslovakia expressed the view that the formulations in
Draft Article 33, such as "essential interest" and "grave and
imminent peril" were "unclear" and that the Draft Article "even
extends the concept of a state of necessity to cases where there is no
immediate threat to the existence of the State as a sovereign and
independent entity." Czechoslovakia further stated that the inclusion
of the necessity provision "raises serious doubts, since, with reference
to safeguarding an 'essential interest,' it actually enables States to

48.
Id. at 1351 132.
49.
Id. at 1352 135.
50.
See Geoffrey Marston, Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis:
The Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 773, 785
(1988). Special Rapporteur Ago adds that "if the two governments [United Kingdom
and France] responsible for the action had invoked the ground of necessity, the absence
in this case of the requisite conditions would have been argued against them."
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at 76.
51.
Comments from Governments, Mongolia, [1981] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 76,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/492 & Add. 1-4.
52.
Id. at 77; Comments from Governments, Sweden, [1981] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 77, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/492 & Add. 1-4.
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violate their international obligations.
Kingdom commented that,

53

More recently, the United

[Itviews] with extreme circumspection the introduction of a right to
depart from international obligations in circumstances where the State
has judged it necessary to do so in order to protect an interest that it
deems "essential." A defence of necessity would be open to very serious
abuse across the whole range of international relations. There is a
54
grave risk that the provision would weaken the rule of law.

C. Scholars
A brief examination of scholarly writing on necessity also reveals
doubt. Even among pre-World War II writers unease is evident.
Stowell found that "this doctrine of necessity strikes at the very root
of international society, and makes the preservation of the separate
states of greater importance than the preservation of the community
of states. ' 55 Basdevant stressed that the question whether necessity
constituted an excuse for not fulfilling an international obligation, was
much debated among authors.5 6 Waldock described the doctrine of
necessity as "a rejection of law," 57 and Brownlie was very critical of
the necessity defense, seeing it as a relic from previous centuries, as
window dressing for raison d'etat and susceptible to selfish
interpretation. 58 Similarly, Higgins asserted that "it is a concept
which cannot be kept within proper bounds. ' 59 Partly based on
Krylov's opinion in the Corfu Channel case, Jim~nez de Ar6chaga, in

53.
Comments from Governments, Czechoslovakia, [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/362. Similarly, Belorussia SSR found that the provisions
"contradicts the essential meaning of the international responsibility of States and are
therefore unacceptable." Comments from Government, Belorussia, [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41362.
54.
Comments from Governments, United Kingdom, Int'l L. Comm., 50th Sess.,
at 87-88, U.N. Doc. AICN.41488 (1998).
These concerns were repeated in 2001.
Comments from Governments, United Kingdom, Int'l L. Comm., 53rd Sess., at 32-33,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515 (2001).
55.

ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 392-93 (1921).

56.
Basdevant, supra note 2, at 551. He further states that "I1ne semble done
pas qu'il existe une r~gle de droit international positif justifiant l'inobservation d'une
r6gle de froit international par l'excuse de n~cessit6." Id. at 553.
57.
C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
InternationalLaw, 81 R.C. 542, 461-62 (1952). In the sixth edition of Brierly's textbook,
which was edited by Waldock, it was found that "the doctrine [of selfpreservation/necessity] would destroy the imperative character of any system of law in
which it applied, for it makes all obligation to obey the law merely conditional." J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE
404 (6th ed. 1963).
58.
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 4249 (1963).
59.
ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 218 (1963).
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1968 wrote that it may be concluded that "there is no general
principle allowing the defence of necessity. ' 60 More recently, Allott
lamented that "among the clearest lessons of our collective experience
is that the concept of state of necessity is the most persistent and
formidable enemy of a truly human society" and the concept is
"enough to destroy any possibility of an international rule of law. ' 61
Other scholars have, however, accepted necessity as part of
international law. Barboza, for example, found that, "purged of some
of the erroneous notions which burdened it," necessity is "a useful
'62
concept.

IV. THE GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECTCASE AND THE CUMULATIVE
CONDITIONS

Against this background, one can understand that it was with
some trepidation that Hungary's advocates pleaded necessity in the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. 63 As it turned out, they need not
have worried. In spite of the somewhat ambiguous attitude towards
necessity exhibited in previous cases, the ICJ found necessity to be
part of customary international law.
Today, after the work of the ILC and the endorsement of the ICJ,
it is fair to echo Schachter's observation that international law rejects
the idea that necessity knows no law. Decades of study have found
that necessity exists in international law and that the best safeguard

60.
Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, InternationalResponsibility, in MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 542 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968). He does recognize
particular rules making allowance for varying degrees of necessity, but "these cases
have a meaning and a scope entirely outside the traditional doctrine." Id.
61.
Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of InternationalLaw,
29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 17, 21 n.1 (1988).
62.
Julio Barboza, Necessity (revisited) in International Law, in Makarczyk,
supra note 20, at 28; see also BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 69 (Grotius Publications Ltd. 1987) (1953).
See generally L. Buza, The State of Necessity in InternationalLaw, 1 ACTA JURIDICA
ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICA 205 (1959). More recently, see G. Marcelo
Kohen, The Notion of "State Survival" in InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW,
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 306 (Laurence Boisson
de Chazournes & Philip Sands eds., 1999), Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a
Justificationfor InternationalWrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 4-12
(2000) and Karl Zemanek, New Trends in the Enforcement of erga omnes Obligations, 4
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 31 (2000).
63.
For a brief discussion of the case, see Phoebe N. Okowa, Case Concerning
the Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject (Hungary/Slovakia),47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 688, 68990 (1998). See also Daniel Dobos, The Necessity of Precaution: The Future of Ecological
Necessity and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 375, 376 (2002).
See generally Mari Nakamichi, The InternationalCourt of Justice Decision Regarding
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 337 (1998).
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against abuse of the concept is its codification in the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility with appropriate, strictly defined, and
cumulative circumscriptions. Additionally, the ICJ emphasized that
"the State concerned is not the sole judge" of whether the conditions
have been met. 64 It is to these conditions we now turn.
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, the ICJ based its
analysis on the conditions enumerated by the ILC in the 1980 Draft
Article 33. Outlining the conditions, the ICJ held:
In the present case, the following basic conditions set forth in Draft
Article 33 are relevant: it must have been occasioned by an "essential
interest" of the State which is the author of the act conflicting with one
of its international obligations; that interest must have been
threatened by a "grave and imminent peril"; the act being challenged
must have been the "only means" of safeguarding that interest; that act
must not have "seriously impair[ed] an essential interest" of the State
towards which the obligation existed; and the State which is the author
of that act must not have "contributed to the occurrence of the state of
65
necessity". Those conditions reflect customary international law.

In taking as its point of reference Draft Article 33, the ICJ diverged
slightly from the new ILC draft. 66 In the following examination,
however, the point of departure will be the most recent and final
Article 25:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State unless the act:
(a) Is the only way...67

According to the Draft Article on necessity, the conduct not in
conformity with an international obligation must be the "only means
of warding off' the peril; "the peril must not have been escapable by
any other means, even a more costly one, that could be adopted in
compliance with international obligations. '68 The ICJ found that
Hungary had other means than suspending and abandoning works
under the 1977 treaty with Czechoslovakia, even though-"and this is
not determinative of the state of necessity"-these other means (for
example, water purification) would "have been a more costly

64.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 40,
51
(Sept. 25).
65.
Id. at 40-41, 52.
66.
The court, for example, reiterates that the balancing of interests is vis 6 vis
"the State towards which the obligation existed." As will be further elaborated upon
below (see discussion, infra note 69), the most recent ILC draft expanded this weighing
of interest in light of erga omnes obligations.
67.
Draft Articles II, supra note 28.
68.
See Report on Work of the 32nd Session, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 33
[hereinafter Report on 32nd Session]. According to Roberto Ago, the conduct must
"truly be the only means." Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at 20, 55.
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technique. '69 As mentioned above, the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea found that "it cannot be suggested that the only
means of safeguarding that interest [Guinea's interest in maximizing
its tax revenue from the sale of gas oil to fishing vessels] was to
extend its customs laws to parts of the exclusive economic zone. '70
...for the State to safeguard an essential interest ...71

Since any invocation of necessity can only be conceived of in
conditions of an absolutely exceptional nature, it naturally follows
that the interest that is protected by breaching an international
obligation must be essential. According to both Ago's and the ILC's
1980 reports the interest should, however, not be limited to the very
72
existence of the state.
What more exactly can be said to constitute "an essential
interest" for a state is somewhat harder to spell out in generalities.
The ILC decided that "it would be pointless to try to spell [essential
interests] out any more clearly and to lay down pre-established
categories of interests. '73 It would depend on the circumstances and
the totality of the conditions in which the state found itself in the
particular case. 74 Similarly, the ILC, in its final Commentary, found
that "the extent to which a given interest is 'essential' depends on all
the circumstances, and cannot be prejudged. '75 In 1980, some broad
categories were nonetheless suggested: the existence of the state, its
political or economic survival, the continued functioning of its
essential services, the maintenance of internal peace, the survival of
a sector of its population, the preservation of the environment of its
territory or a part thereof. 76 The 2001 Commentary lists similar

69.

Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 42-43,

55.
70.
The M/V "Saiga"(No. 2) Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1352,
135 (1999).
71.
Draft Articles II, supra note 28.
72.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at 19, 12.
73.
Report of the LL.C., [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 49, 32.
74.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at 19, 12.
75.
CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 183, 15.
76.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at 14, 2. Curiously, Ago finds
not so different an enumeration of categories "of little use" to help determine a specific
situation. Id. at 19,
12 n.24. It may be noted that first Ago and then the ILC
provided their examples of essential interests in the beginning of the Commentary and
Report respectively to illustrate the difference between necessity and other categories
of Chapter V: 'Circumstances precluding wrongfulness' and not when discussing
essential interests. Ago, however, indicates in a footnote that the examples provided
are "often invoked in this context as 'essential' or 'particularly important' interests of
the State." Id. at 14,
2 n.4. The ICJ picked from the selection when finding the
natural environment an essential interest. Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos Project (Hung. V.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41, 53.
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interests as potentially essential. 77

Although the state claiming to have acted in a state of necessity
must be able to point to an essential interest under threat, it would
seem that reference to one of the broad categories just outlined would
suffice. Such a conclusion seems to be supported by the ICJ in the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project judgment. In this case, the court

quickly acknowledged that the concerns expressed by Hungary for its
natural environment "related to an 'essential interest' of [Hungary],
within the meaning given to that expression in Article 33" of the 1980
ILC Draft. 78 Justifying this, the court referred to the inclusion of "the
preservation of the environment" in the ILC report and to its own
findings in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion concerning
"the great significance that [the ICJ] attaches to respect for the
environment, not only for States but also for the whole of mankind. '79
One may add that it may be difficult for an international judicial
authority to overrule or second-guess the claim of a state, save if it
were completely disingenuous. This attitude may be seen reflected in
the following dictum from the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, considering that maximizing a country's tax revenues may be
important but hardly essential: "however essential Guinea's interest
in maximizing its tax revenue from the sale of gas oil to fishing
vessels, it cannot be suggested that the only means of safeguarding
that interest was to extend its customs laws to parts of the exclusive
economic zone. 80 This would indicate that the actual judicial test
with regard to the interest under threat is not its "essential"
character but rather the presence of one or more of the additional
cumulative conditions, in particular the graveness and imminence of
the peril and the question of own fault.
An interesting question is whether essential interest may
include events that do not have a direct impact on the state claiming
to act under necessity. This appears to be what Belgium was arguing
when it claimed before the ICJ that "necessity is the cause which
justifies the violation of a binding rule in order to safeguard, in face of
grave and imminent peril, values which are higher than those
protected by the rule which is breached."''s Although referring
explicitly to Article 33, the Belgian advocate provided the court with a
definition of necessity where "values" is substituted for "essential

77.

CRAWFORD, supra note 27, at 183,

14.

78.
Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41, 53.
79.
Id. (referring to Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 241, 242, 29).
80.
The MV "Saiga"(No. 2) Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M 1323, 1352
135 (emphasis added).
81.
See Uncorrected Transcript of Belgium's Oral Pleadings (Serb. & Mont. v.
Belg.), CR 99/15 (May 10, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org, (last visited Sept.
22, 2002) (emphasis added).
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interest." The Commentary of Ago and the ILC Report both appear to
accept such an interpretation of "essential interest" although the
wording of Article 33 does not bear this out.8 2 However, both of the
narratives address interventions for humanitarian purposes "such as
saving the lives of nationals or foreigners threatened" or
interventions in cases of "grave and imminent danger . . . simply to
people." 83 Citing these examples, Verwey wrote that
[It] must be assumed therefore, that the ILC, when it was drafting
Article 33 within the context of a document on State responsibility, may
have lost sight of acts of a State aimed at safeguarding essential
interests of a non-national nature, without intending to exclude the
84
potential applicability of the principle of necessity to such acts.

The latest re-drafting would appear to follow these considerations.
Paragraph 1(a) now reads "safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril" as opposed to the original 1980 version:
"safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and
imminent peril."8 5
...against

a grave and imminent peril; and.. 86

Although the final article adopted by the ICL only stipulates that
the peril which threatens the essential interest must be "grave" both
Ago's commentary and the 1980 ILC Report point out that the peril
must be "extremely grave. 87 In addition, the threat to the essential
interest must be "imminent," "representing a present danger," "at the
actual time. 88s This is also reflected in the 2001 Commentary
according to which the "peril has to be objectively established and not
merely apprehended as possible."8 9 Beyond these somewhat general
observations, the Commentary and Report are rather parsimonious.
The ICJ held that peril evokes the idea of "risk" and that the
peril has to be established "at the relevant point in time" and, hence,
not be a mere "possibility."90 The court, however, added that a peril

82.
Essential State Interest, in Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at
51; Report of the International Law Commission, Essential Interest of the State,
reported in [1980] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 49,
32, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (adopted by the
ILC) [hereinafterEssential Interest of the State].
83.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, at 43, 69; Essential Interest of
the State, supra note 80, at 41, T 23.
84.
W.D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention under International Law, 32
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 357, 413 (1985).
85.
Draft Articles I, supra note 25, art. 33.
86.
Draft Articles II, supra note 28.
87.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 9 13, 19, at 43; Essential

Interest of the State, supra note 80,
88.
89.
90.

33, at 48.

Essential Interest of the State, supra note 80, 33, at 48.
CRAWFORD, supra note 27, 9 15, at 183; see also 1997 I.C.J. 92, 54, at 42.
Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 92, 9 54, at
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appearing in the long term may well be imminent if the realization of
the peril "however far off [temporally] it might be, is not thereby any
less certain and inevitable." 91 Similarly, the 2001 Commentary holds
that "a measure of uncertainty about the future does not necessarily
disqualify a state from invoking necessity, if the peril is clearly
established on the basis of the evidence reasonably available at the
time. '9 2 As pointed out by both the International Court and by the
ILC, long-term predictions and prognoses are particularly pertinent
93
to questions concerning threats to, for example, the environment.
Although not spelled out by the court, it is possible to discern what is
termed
the
"precautionary
principle"
from
international
environmental law in the court's deliberations. 94 However, although
Hungary had some "uncertainties," about the potential ecological
impact of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project, such concerns, serious as
they were, were insufficient to establish the objective existence of a
"peril" in the context of the necessity defense. 95
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community
96
as a whole.

The interest which is protected by the international obligation
breached due to the state of necessity "must obviously be inferior to"
the threatened essential interest of the State claiming necessity and,

91.
Id. In the concrete case, the court found that although an "essential
interest", i.e. the environment, was involved, the threat in the case of Nagymaros was
neither grave nor imminent. Id.
55, at 42-43, and in the case of the Gabcikovo sector
not imminent, its graveness untold. Id.
56-57, at 43-46.
92.
CRAWFORD, supra note 27, 16, at 184.
93.
Id.
94.
According to the Rio Declaration, Principle 15, the precautionary principle
holds that:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment
and
Development,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.73.II.A.14
(1992),
available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2004). Cameron and Abouchar find that the 1992 U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development "marked the full emergence of the precautionary
principle in international law. Through participation in negotiations, signature and
ratification of treaties, states have widely acknowledged the existence of the principle
as a principle of international law." James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Status of the
Precautionary Principle in InternationalLaw, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 51-52 (Davis Freestone &

Ellen Hay eds., 1996).
95.
Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J 7,
96.
Draft Articles II, supra note 28.

54, at 42.
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consequently, "cannot be one which is comparable and equally
essential to the foreign State concerned. '97 As the 2001 Commentary
notes, "the interest relied on must outweigh all other considerations,
not merely from the point of view of the acting state but on a
reasonable assessment of competing interests." 98 During the recent
review, the Special Rapporteur, James Crawford, proposed an
amendment of Article 33(1)(b), adjusting it to conform with
contemporary international law which includes obligations erga
omnes.99 This proposal has been codified in the reference to "the
international community as a whole." Boed, in arguing for exactly
such an amendment, noted that the bilateral paradigm, which was
evident in the original wording, "fails to account for the advent of
human rights law from the middle of the twentieth century and the
resulting creation of erga omnes obligations."' 10 0
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or... 101

In some cases, the international obligation in question may,
explicitly or by inference, exclude a plea of necessity. This is
10 2
particularly the case in regard to certain humanitarian obligations.
Below, it will briefly be considered whether the U.N. Charter, by

97.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 15, at 20. In the words of the
ILC, "[t]he interest sacrificed on the alter of 'necessity must obviously be less important
than the interest it is thereby sought to save." Essential Interest of the State, supra note
80, 35, at 50. The ICJ found that there was "no need" to consider this criteria since
Hungary had already failed other parts of the necessity test. Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos
Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 58, at 46.
98.

CRAWFORD, supra note 27,

17, at 184.

99.
See Crawford, supra note 26,
290, at 32; see also James R. Crawford,
Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 303, 306 (2001) ("[Ilt seems clear that there are standards of conduct in
international law that cannot be reduced to the interstate realm.").
100.
Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for International
Wrongful Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 19 (2000). Addressing the specific
issue of the use of necessity to justify a state's closure of its borders in face of a large
number of asylum seekers, Boed suggests that, with the new wording,
[T]he interest of the international community in having non-refoulment
honored, then, could possibly outweigh the interest of a single state in closing
its borders to protect an essential interest and, in consequence, necessity would
not be available to justify border closure in the face of an influx of asylumseekers.
Id. at 41.
101.
102.

Draft Articles II, supra note 28.
CRAWFORD, supra note 27,

19 at 185.
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explicitly allowing for one exception to the ban on use of force,
implicitly excluded any other exceptions.
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.

103

The State claiming to be acting under a state of necessity "must
not itself have provoked" the situation or have helped "by act or
omission to bring it about. ' 10 4 In the case before the ECJ mentioned
previously, the court noted that one defendant had made "an
erroneous evaluation of an unfavourable economic situation which
was known to all" and, thus, the court noted "that personal conduct
does not entitle it to rely on a state of necessity."'1 5 Similarly, in the
Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject case, the court concluded that Hungary
could not rely on a state of necessity because "it had helped, by act or
omission to bring it about.' 06 In the case of the Kosovo conflict and
the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgium
has, as noted, for its defense in front of the ICJ, in part, relied on the
necessity excuse.' 0 7 Brownlie and Apperley seem to have found such a
defense precluded because the "crisis in Kosovo originated in the
deliberate fomenting of civil strife in Kosovo and the subsequent
intervention by NATO States in the civil war. In such conditions
those States responsible for the civil strife and the intervention are
estopped from pleading humanitarian purposes."' 0 8

V. PEREMPTORY NORMS AND NECESSITY: THE USE OF FORCE AS A
POSSIBLE DIFFERENTIATION?

A. Background
The weariness and concern often expressed about the necessity
excuse are primarily due to the past, and potential future, abuse of
the excuse, particularly involving the use of force.' 09 This concern

103.
Draft Articles II, supra note 28.
104.
Essential Interest of the State, supra note 80,
34, at 50; GabcikovoNagymarcos Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7,
57, at 45-46. The court found
that this, also, precluded Hungary from relying on a state of necessity excuse.
105.
Joined Cases 154, 205-06, 226-28, 263-64, 78, 31, 39, 83 & 85/79, S.p.A.
Ferriera Valsabbia and Others v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 907, reprinted in 1981
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 613, 702, 144.
106.
Gabcikovo-Nagymarcos Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. No. 92,
57,
at 46.
107.
See Uncorrected Transcript of Belgium's Oral Pleadings, supra note 81.
108.
Ian Brownlie & C.J. Apperley, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the
InternationalLaw Aspects, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 878, 903 (2000).

109.

Jean J.A. Salmon, Faut-il codifier l'etat de necessite en droit international?,

in Makarczyk, supra note 20, at 258.
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was reflected in the dissenting opinion of Judge Krylov in the Corfu
Channel case, where he wrote that since the coming into force of the
U.N. Charter, "the so-called right of self-help, also known as the law
of necessity (Notrecht) which used to be upheld by a number of
German authors, can no longer be invoked. It must be regarded as
obsolete."1 10
In his review of the positions taken by authors of scholarly
works, Ago found that writers who opposed necessity as being part of
international law, partly did so due to practical considerations based
on the outright abuses of the necessity excuse by some
governments. 11 ' Ago and the ILC sought to allay the fears of abuse by
observing "an outright rejection of the idea that a 'plea of necessity'
could absolve a State of the wrongfulness attaching to an act of
aggression committed by [that] State. '112 In the proposed Article 33,
this was done by stipulating that necessity may not be invoked as a
ground precluding wrongfulness if the breached obligation arose from
a peremptory norm. The fact that the reference to peremptory norms
in the final version has been given its own article (Article 26) does not
seem to change the substantial issue. 113 Additionally, the necessity
excuse is also not available if the obligation being breached excludes
the possibility of invoking necessity. As for the latter, one may ask
whether the U.N. Charter, by explicitly allowing for one exception to
the ban on use of force, i.e., self-defense under Article 51, implicitly
excluded any other exceptions, including necessity. Ago asserted that
it does not logically follow from the inclusion of Article 51 that the
intention was to absolutely exclude other circumstances precluding
114
wrongfulness.

110.
The Corfu Channel Case (Eng. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 77 (April 9); see also
Josef Mrazek, Prohibitionof the Use and Threat of Force: Self-Defense and Self-Help in
InternationalLaw, XXVII CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 81, 107 (1989) (observing of Draft Article
33, "[t]he standpoint of the International Law Commission calls into question the
peremptory character of the principle of the non-use of force. The right of necessity
must not be misused to undermine the stability of international legal order").
111.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 71, at 47. Ago paraphrased
the critical position as follows:
[]e
are opposed to recognizing the ground of necessity as a principle of
general international law because States use and abuse that so-called principle
for inadmissible and often unadmittable purposes; but we are ultimately
prepared to grant it a limited function in certain specific areas of international
law less sensitive than those in which the abuses we deplore usually occur.
Id.

76, at 50.
112.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 79, at 51.
113.
Article 26 states "Compliance with peremptory norms: Nothing in the
Chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity
with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law."
Draft Articles II,supra note 28.
114.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 59, at 41.
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More interesting and controversial is the general question
whether the use of force is prohibited by a peremptory norm. Ago
devoted a substantial part of his Commentary to the question of use
of force and the necessity excuse. He asserted that the prohibition on
the use of force in international relations found in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter not only covers "aggression," i.e., the most serious use of
force, but also other less serious acts besides those which merit being
classified as acts of aggression. 15 Hence, whereas Ago acknowledged
that even uses of force that are "circumscribed in magnitude and
duration" and carried out for "limited purposes" and "without true
aggressive intentions" are prohibited, he questioned whether all uses
of force are prohibited by a peremptory norm. He found that to claim
that all uses of force are prohibited jus cogens "might be to expand
beyond what is at present accepted by the legal conviction of States,
either the concept of 'aggression' or the concept of 'peremptory norm'
as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
16
Treaties."1
The 1980 ILC Report echoes Ago's findings; "It remained to
consider the problem of the possible existence of conduct which,
although infringing the territorial sovereignty of a State, need not
necessarily be considered as an act of aggression or not, in any case,
as a breach of an international obligation jus cogens."117 Like Ago, the
ILC maintained that it is for the organs charged with interpreting the
U.N. Charter to determine whether the differentiation is valid. 118 As
is evident from the quotes, Ago employed very careful language,
although it is clear from the context that he believed the
differentiation of the prohibition of use of force into two categories
was possible. Ago "hesitated to ascribe the same force of jus cogens as
must, in our view, be accorded to the prohibition of aggression."' 19

115.
Id. 58, at 40-41.
116.
Id.
59, at 41. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defines a peremptory
norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted... "
117.
Essential Interest of the State, supra note 80, 23, at 43; see also STANIMIR
A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

108 (1996) ("According to such definitions [aggression as any illegal use of force], since
the use or threat of force is allowed only in self-defense or if decided upon by a
competent organ of the United Nations, every other use of force should be considered
aggression. Such proposals, however, ignore the views that not every unlawful use of
force is necessarily aggression."). Alexandrov does, however, warn against adopting the
doctrine of necessity due to the risk of reviving theories of self-preservation. Id. at 182
n.298.
118.
EssentialInterest of the State, supra note 80, 24, at 45.
119.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 66, at 44.
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A few scholars have built on the foundation provided by Ago and
the ILC. 120 Ronzitti emphasized the requirement for a peremptory
norm in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, i.e., that the norm must
be accepted as peremptory by the international community of states
as a whole. Based on this, he found that the "peremptory rule
banning the use of force does not exactly coincide with the
corresponding rule contained in Art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter," or, in
other words, some uses of force, although prohibited under Article
121
2(4) are not prohibited by a peremptory norm.
Raby, considering the use of force to protect nationals, found that
"the considerable number of states which claim that the right of
intervention is valid, as well as the numerous writers who think
likewise, demonstrate that intervention to protect nationals cannot
certainly be seen as a violation of a norm of jus cogens.''122 He went on
the point out that a state cannot consent to the violation of a
peremptory norm: "Therefore, if an intervention to protect nationals
constituted a violation of a rule of jus cogens, the territorial state's
consent to such an intervention would be an irrelevant consideration
in assessment of the operation's legality. However, there is unanimity
among states and writers that an intervention by consent is legal, by
123
virtue of that consent alone.'
Conversely, however, one might argue that it is misplaced to
speak of consent to a violation of a jus cogens norm. Fundamentally,
the norm is not violated if the intervention is consensual. As stated by
Schachter:
[WIhen a recognized government invites foreign armed forces to assist
it in maintaining internal security, the foreign troops would not, as a
rule, be used "against the territorial integrity" or "political
independence" of the inviting State nor would their role normally be
inconsistent with any of the purposes of the United Nations. If those
stated conditions are met, there is no violation of Article 2(4).124

120.
See Ole Spiermann, Humanitarian Intervention as a Necessity and the
Threat or Use of Jus Cogens, 71 NORDIC J. INTL L. 523, 535-42 (for recent comments on
this issue).
121.
Natalino Ronzitti, Use of Force, Jus Cogens and State Consent, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 150 (A. Cassese ed., 1986); see also
NATALINO RONZIrrI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY COERCION AND
INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF HUMANITY 74-75 (1985).

122.
Jean Raby, The State of Necessity and the Use of Force to Protect Nationals,
XXVI CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253, 267 (1988); see also Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 106,

55, at 125 (Bruno

Simma ed., 1994) (referring to Raby's article, Randelzhofer's commentary of U.N.
Charter dismisses argument that concept of necessity can provide valid basis for
protective measures involving use of force).
123.
Raby, supranote 122, at 268; see also RONZITTI, supra note 121, at 86-88.
124.

SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 114.
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Schachter further found that "the distinction drawn by the
Commission appears to be in keeping with the views generally
1 25
expressed on the peremptory character of the rule against force."'
One may inquire whether developments subsequent to 1980, the
date of Ago's Commentary, have clarified the issue. First, there is no
doubt that international law recognizes a gradation of the use of force
with some uses being less grave than others. One may distinguish
between "the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting
an armed attack) and other less grave forms."'12 6 The ICJ, however,
quoted the ILC with approval to the effect that "the law of the
Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law
having the character of jus cogens."''2 7 In the 1987 Declaration on the
Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from
the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, it is
emphasized that "[n]o consideration of whatever nature may be
invoked to warrant resorting to threat or use of force in violation of
the Charter.' 128 Similarly, during the most recent reexamination of
the Draft Article on necessity, both the Special Rapporteur and the
ILC expressed that, in their views, the prohibition on the use of force
the
is a peremptory norm. 129 Likewise, some authors have criticized
130
differentiation proposed by Ago and the 1980 Commission.
The question of use of force and necessity attracted particular
interest and concern in 1999 due to the debates over humanitarian
intervention. In his review of Ago's Commentary, Crawford found
that the differentiation-between the peremptory status of some
aspects of the rules relating to the use of force and the nonperemptory status of other aspects-raised complex questions
"beyond the scope of the draft article," and he emphasized the

Id. at 171.
125.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 191
126.
(June 27).
127.
Id. at 190. This was supported by both Nicaragua and the United States in
their respective submissions. Id.
128.
Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22,
U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., Annex, § 1, art. 3, U.N. Doc. AIRES/42/22 (1987). Recall that
Ago's point of departure was a recognition that even the 'less grave" use of force
violated the Charter.
According to the Special Rapporteur, rules relating to the use of force
129.
referred to in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter certainly rank among peremptory
norms of international law. Crawford, supra note 26, T 286. According to the ILC, "it
was generally agreed that the rules governing the use of force in the Charter were jus
cogens." Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Fifty-Fourth Session, T 375,
U.N. Doc. A/54/10, Supp. No. 10 (1999).
130.
See, e.g., Jean J.A. Salmon, Faut-il codifier l'etat de necessite en droit
international?,in Makarczyk, supra note 20, at 235.
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distinction between "primary" and "secondary" rules.1 31 With regard
to this latter distinction, it was pointed out that "it is one thing to
define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes, and another
to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what
should be the consequence of the violation."'132 Based on the
distinction, it was stipulated that the question of humanitarian
intervention is "not one which is regulated, primarily or at all, by
article 33.' '133 Interpreting this distinction, it can be concluded that
the final Article 25 does not and cannot act as a source of authority
for humanitarian intervention or for use of force against terrorists.
In response to a suggestion by the Netherlands, the Special
Rapporteur, however, presented a somewhat equivocal comment on
this issue. The Netherlands, in brief, suggested that Chapter V
concerning circumstances precluding wrongfulness should include an
article on humanitarian intervention. 134 In his comment, the Special

131.
Crawford, supra note 26, 7 275-91, at 24; James Crawford, First Report on
State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., at 4, T112-18, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/490
(1998) (distinguishing between primary and secondary rules).
132.
Id.
133.
Crawford, supra note 26, I 275-91, at 287. The distinction was present in
Ago's Commentary as well, and has been reiterated in several cases. Ago pointed out
that the answer
[D]epends primarily on the interpretation to be placed on certain provisions of
the Charter, an instrument of conventional origin, or, in other words, on certain
primary rules enunciated in that instrument. The task of deciding what that
answer will be therefore rests with the various organs responsible for such
interpretation, and not with a draft concerning the definition of "secondary"
rules on international responsibility on which the Commission is working.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 66, at 44. In the France-New Zealand
arbitration tribunal in the Rainbow Warrior case, France and New Zealand disagreed
on the question of which branch of general international law should be given primary
emphasis in the determination of the primary obligations of France. New Zealand held
that the customary law of treaties should decide, while France favored the customary
law of state responsibility. The tribunal found that both the customary law of treaties
and the customary law of state responsibility were relevant and appropriate. The
fundamental provision of pacta sunt servanda "is applicable to the determination
whether there have been violations of that principle . . ." Rainbow Warrior (New
Zealand v. France), 82 INT'L L. REP. 548-50, 7 72-75 (1990). On the other hand, "the
legal consequences of a breach of a treaty, including the determination of the
circumstances that may exclude wrongfulness . . . are subjects that belong to the
customary Law of State Responsibility." Similarly, in the Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject
case the ICJ established that a state of necessity does not terminate a treaty but may
be "invoked to exonerate from the responsibility of the State which failed to implement
the treaty." Thus, the court implicitly held that the (primary) rules of treaty
termination are found in the law of treaties and not in the (secondary) rules of state
responsibility. Gabceikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, at 63,
101.
134.
See State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received from
Governments: Netherlands, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., at 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/515
(2001).
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Rapporteur first pointed out the distinction between primary and
secondary rules, emphasizing that Chapter V does not deal with
substantial law issues. He then added, "Cases not otherwise provided
for may be dealt with in accordance with the criteria in article 26
(necessity) [now Article 25].1"135 The most reasonable interpretation of
this comment would seem to be the following: In light of the previous
discussion about humanitarian intervention and necessity, the
Special Rapporteur appears, again, to have said, "Look, this is not an
issue we are going to decide here. Maybe specific cases can be excused
under the necessity defense, maybe not. You try to see whether the
criteria fit in each individual case." Indeed, in the Final Commentary,
it was pointed out that "the question whether measures of forcible
humanitarian intervention, not sanctioned pursuant to Chapters VII
or VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, may be lawful under
modern international law, is not covered by article 25."
The last re-reading by Crawford and the ILC, thus, does not
address the question upon which Ago wanted to shed light.
[W]hether or not the wrongfulness, which is in principle accepted as
undeniable, of any such action might, by way of exception, be precluded
where the State which committed it is able to show that it acted on a
real "state of necessity," with all the conditions for the recognition of
136
the existence of that circumstance being fulfilled.

Against this background, it would be fair to conclude that Crawford
and the ILC found that necessity was not an appropriate framework
for addressing the question of humanitarian intervention, or, more
generally, exceptions to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. In other
words, necessity cannot function as a source of authority. The ILC did
not, however, disown Ago's Commentary as such. If one accepts this
rendition of the relationship between Ago's and Crawford's

In connection with this chapter, which deals with circumstances precluding
wrongfulness, the Netherlands would draw attention to the debate currently
under way, for example, in the Security Council about the concept of
humanitarian intervention. This is because humanitarian intervention,
without prior authorization by the Security Council and without permission
from the legitimate Government of the State on whose territory the
intervention takes place, can be seen-in exceptional situations, because of
large-scale violations of fundamental human rights or the immediate threat of
such violations-as a potential justification for an internationally wrongful act,
namely the actual or threatened use of force if this is required for
humanitarian ends and satisfies a series of conditions. The Netherlands takes
the view that an article containing such a ground for justification should be
included.

Id.
135.
James Crawford,
Special Rapporteur, Fourth Report on State
Responsibility, Int'l L. Comm'n, 56th Sess., Addendum, at 4, U.N. Dec.
AICN.4/517/Add. 1 (2001).
136.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 61, at 42.
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commentaries, it is not precluded to attempt to justify the use of force
under the necessity excuse, although such a justification may not be
accepted by, for example, the ICJ. The necessity excuse can, however,
only be sought and invoked as an excuse ex post facto and not as a
source of authority.
B. Practice
The necessity excuse appears to have been put forward as
justification in at least three cases of use of force in international
relations. First, in 1960, Belgium dispatched a contingent of troops to
Congo less than two weeks after the Republic of Congo became
independent. Subsequent to independence, mutinies broke out and
European residents were perceived to be at risk. In the Security
Council, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Belgium
had been forced by necessity to take this purely humanitarian
action. 137 The debate in the Security Council primarily concerned the
facts, and no principled discussion took place about the legality or
otherwise of Belgium's justification. Ago, however, noted as "not
unimportant" that there was "no denial of the principle of the plea of
138
necessity as such.'
Second, following the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 and
throughout the 1990s, Turkey has conducted numerous operations

137.
Id.
64, at 43. In the Security Council, the Belgian representative argued
among other things that:
[T]he intervention of Belgium [sic] metropolitan troops is thus justified, first by
the total inability of the Congolese national authorities to ensure respect for
fundamental rules which must be observed in any civilized community and by
the Belgian government's sacred duty to take the measures required by
morality and by public international law.
U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 873d mtg., at 35, U.N. Doc S/PV. 873 (1960), available at
http://unbisnet.un.org
[And further that] it is justified by the complete absence of interference by the
Belgian Government in the internal affairs of the Republic of Congo

Id.
[And finally that] the Belgian Government can only interpret the statement
just made by Mr. Hammarskjold as recognition of the material necessity for
Belgian military intervention in the Congo, and indeed as an implicit
acknowledgement of the legality of the action my country was compelled to take
in order to protect its nationals and in the interest of the Congo and the
international community at large. This intervention, which was, I believe I
have shown, imperative and unavoidable, is strictly proportional to the
objective in view [law].
Id. at 36.
138.

Id.
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against Kurdish groups, primarily the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK),
in northern Iraq without the authorization of the Iraqi government.
Initially, the Turkish operations consisted of air strikes and small
troop incursions. 139 Iraq protested these incursions in letters to the
Security Council. 140 In the autumn of 1992, thousands of Turkish
troops crossed into Iraq and by November 1, 20,000 troops were in
northern Iraq.14 1 In 1995, Turkey launched Operation Steel during
which, on March 20, a massive Turkish military force crossed into
Iraq to eliminate several guerrilla strongholds of the PKK. An
estimated 35,000 troops supported by tanks and combat airplanes
took part. 14 2 The incursion was alleged to be in response to a March
18 PKK attack on Turkish troops in South West Turkey. After the
attack, the PKK forces retreated back into Iraq. The Turkish Prime
Minister Tansu Ciller described the aim of the operation to be "to rip
out the roots of the terror operations aimed at our innocent
people." 143 A White House spokesman, on March 20, said that the
administration understood "Turkey's need to deal decisively" with the
terrorists, and on March 21, the U.S. State Department spokesman
said that Turkey was not in violation of international law if it used
necessary and appropriate force to protect itself. The French foreign
minister, however, condemned the attack as a violation of Iraq's
sovereignty. 144 The Iraqi foreign ministry spokesman said on March
22 that the operation was "a violation of Iraq's sovereignty" and the
EU troika (France, Germany, and Spain) traveled to Turkey and

139.
See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Puts Mild Pressureon Turks to End Attacks, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at All; Turkey Tells Why Its Troops Are in Iraq, WASH. POST,
Aug. 9, 1991, at A18 (Turkish spokesman observing that "[t]his is not a war. This is
just an operation against terrorists").
140.
See Letter dated 13 October 1991 from the Permanent Representative of
Iraq, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23141 (Oct. 14, 1991), available at
http://unbisnet.un.org (registering the protest of Iraq); Letter dated 16 October 1991
from the Permanent Representative of Iraq, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/23152
(Oct. 17, 1991), available at http://unbisnet.un.org (complaining of "further violations
committed by Turkish aircraft against the territorial integrity and national sovereignty
and security" of Iraq).
141.
Turkish Campaign Routs Kurdish Rebels; Iraqi Kurds Aid Action, FACTS
ON FILE, Dec. 31, 1992, at 967; see also Caryle Murphy, Turkish Army Presses Offensive
in Iraq; Troops Escalate Fight Against Kurdish Rebels; Iraqi Kurds Help Reluctantly,
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1992, at A29.
142.
See generally Nicole Pope, The Turkish Invasion of Northern Iraq, 497
MIDDLE EAST INT'L 3 (1995); Nicole Pope, A Deal with Iraq's Kurds?, 498 MIDDLE EAST
INT'L 7 (1995).
143.
KESSING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 40473 (1995).
144.
55 FACTS ON FILE 217 (1995); see also France Condemns Turkish Offensive
against Kurds in Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 21, 1995, available at 1995 WL
7781954. The French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said that 'Turkey . . . has to
respect the basic principles of human rights, democracy and the right to self-defense."
Id. The French, who chaired the rotating EU presidency, did not find that Turkey
respected these principles. Id.
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urged the Turks to end the offensive. 145 Subsequently, the critique of
Turkey's actions increased and the relationship between Europe and
Turkey deteriorated. 1 46 Finally, on May 4, the Turkish Defense
Minister, Mehmet Golan, announced that all 35,000 Turkish troops
had left northern Iraq. 147 As early as the beginning of the summer of
1995, Turkey had, however, resumed its recurrent incursions, and
148
Iraq continued to complain to the U.N. Security Council.
Beyond general statements, Turkish authorities have been
rather

parsimonious

when

it

comes

to

presenting

any

legal

justifications for the frequent forays into Iraq. As pointed out by
Gray, spokespersons of the U.S. Administration appeared to have
articulated more consistent legal arguments than the Turks
themselves. 14 9 As a matter of fact, Libya responded to the claim by
the United States that the Turkish action was taken in self-defense,
calling it an act of aggression. 150 Turkey replied to the Libyan

accusations by stressing that Turkey was "resorting to legitimate
measures which are imperative to its own security [and which]
cannot be regarded as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty."' 51 These
measures were taken because "Iraq ha[d] been unable to exercise its
authority [and, hence] Turkey cannot ask the government of Iraq to

145.
See KEESING'S, supra note 143, at 40474; see also Shada Islam, Europe's
Stern Warning, 497 MIDDLE EAST INT'L 4 (1995).
146.
On March 27, the German foreign Minister, Mr. Kinkel announced that a
$100 million government subsidy to Turkey had been suspended because of the
possibility that the offensive would drag on. The EU foreign ministers on April 10
issued a joint statement which called on Turkey to withdraw "without delay." The
ministers, however, also acknowledged the gravity of "terrorist problems" facing
Turkey. KEESING'S, supra note 143, at 40552. The U.S. Secretary of State similarly

stated that U.S. and international support would be forthcoming only if troops were
promptly withdrawn and the Council of Europe passed a resolution that would suspend
Turkish membership unless it showed significant progress toward ending it military
operations in Iraq. 55 FACTS ON FILE 315 (1995).
147.
KEESING'S, supra note 143, at 40563.
148.
See, for example, the "strong condemnation" of Turkey's territorial
incursions issued by the Council of the League of Arab States. Letter dated 24
September 1996 from the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States, U.N.
SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1996/796 (Sept. 26, 1996), available at
http://unbisnet.un.org. See also the incursion initiated on May 13, 1997, which was
condemned by the League of Arab States and the Coordinating Bureau of the
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Identical Letters dated 14 June 1995 from the
Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Representative of Iraq, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/1997/461 (June 16, 1997), available at http://unbisnet.un.org.
149.
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 104 (2000).
150.
Letter dated 12 July 1995 from the Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent
Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/566
(July 12, 1995), available at http://unbisnet.un.org.
151.
Letter dated 24 July 1995 from Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent
Mission of Turkey, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/605 (July 24, 1995),
available at http://unbisnet.un.org.
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fulfill its obligations under international law, to prevent the use of its
territory for the staging of terrorist acts against Turkey.' 52 Scholars,
too, appear inclined to treat the incursions as self-defense, although
they find them unacceptable. Alexandrov, for example, concludes that
"the reaction of the international community made it clear that the
self-defense justification was found unacceptable and that Turkey's
153
action had pre-emptive and punitive purpose."'
In spite of the fact that the United States volunteered the right
of self-defense as a justification for the Turkish actions, the Turkish
statements, few as they are, would appear more consistent with a
claim of necessity. 15 4 One reason why necessity comes to mind when
reading the Turkish letters to the Security Council is the emphasis
placed on the fact that Iraq, since 1991, has been unable to exercise
its authority over the northern part of the country. 15 5 Under the
circumstances, Turkey found that its resort to "measures imperative
to its own security [the incursions into Iraq] originating from the
principle of self-preservation and necessities, cannot be regarded as a
56
violation of Iraq's sovereignty."'
Overall, one may briefly examine whether the Turkish
incursions fulfill the criteria for a state of necessity. It can certainly
be argued that terrorist cross-border attacks may threaten an
essential interest. This issue will be addressed below. Whether the
specific situation in southeast Turkey is serious enough to constitute

152.
Id. In later letters to the Security Council, Turkey emphasized that it
"continues to stand for Iraq's rights as a sovereign State" and pointed to the inability of
the Iraqi authorities "to exercise [their] authority over the northern parts of [their]
territory" which "continues to provide room for frequent violations of Turkish borders
and territory in the form of terrorist infiltrations." Identical letters dated 3 January
1997 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1997/7 (Jan. 3, 1997), available at http://unbisnet.un.org; see also Identical Letters
dated 16 July 1997 from Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey,
U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. Sf1997/552 (July 18, 1997), available at
http://unbisent.un.org.
153.

STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (1996).
154.
See also Dinstein, who categorizes the Turkish actions under "extraterritorial law enforcement," which, as discussed previously, covers the situations
where armed bands or terrorists operate from a certain territory but without the
complicity of the territorial sovereign, i.e. what is here referred to as necessity. YORAM
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 218 (3d ed. 2001).

155.
See, e.g., Letter dated 24 July 1995 from Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the
Permanent Mission of Turkey, supra note 151. Identical Letter dated 27 June 1996
from the Charge d'Affaires A.I of the Permanent Mission of Turkey, U.N. SCOR, 51st
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1996/479 (July 2, 1996), available at http://unbisent.un.org; Identical
Letters dated 3 January 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey, supra
note 152.
156.
Identical Letters dated 27 June 1996 from the Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the
Permanent Mission of Turkey, supra note 155 (emphasis added). It should be noted
that the necessity defense is only applicable if an otherwise wrongful act has been
committed, i.e. the violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
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a grave and imminent peril is, of course, debatable. Turkey claimed
that "every day, many innocent citizens of Turkey have lost their lives
and suffered incalculable damage because of the violent terrorist
attacks coming from Iraqi territory. '15 7 Also debatable is the question
of whether the only way to deal with the situation is through military
means. Conversely, the fact that the incursions have continued over
most of a decade would indicate that military means in and of
themselves are unsuccessful. The question of whether the incursions
seriously impair a countervailing essential interest is closely tied to
the issue of whether the use of force is possible under the necessity
excuse. Hence, an answer to this question depends on how one views
this latter problem as discussed above.
Finally, one may ask whether Turkey had contributed to the
situation of necessity. It is certainly possible to argue that the
political and bureaucratic intolerance and suppression of the Kurdish
minority, caused by the perceived threat to the unity of the Turkish
Republic, have pushed some Kurds to armed resistance, including the
use of terrorism. This argument would, however, run afoul of the, by
now, generally accepted principle that no excuse exists for the use of
terrorism. More plausibly, perhaps, one could argue that the reason
the Iraqi government is unable to exercise its authority in the north
is the imposition of no-fly zones, patrolled by the United States and
United Kingdom. The planes are stationed in Turkey and, hence, the
no-fly zones can only operate with Turkish approval and assistance.
In one of its letters, however, Turkey stress that it "bears no
158
responsibility" for the situation in northern Iraq.
The third case in which the necessity excuse appears to have
been put forward as justification occurred in 1999. Belgium, again, in
part relied on the necessity excuse for justification of use of force, this
time before the ICJ. Having been charged by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia with inter alia "taking part in the bombing of the territory
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . . . in breach of its obligation

not to use force against another State," Belgium primarily claimed
that the NATO intervention was "entirely legal" and "compatible with
Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter." 159 Belgium, however, in the
alternative raised the state of necessity justification in case the court
remained unconvinced that humanitarian intervention as described
by Belgium was justified by international law. Although explicitly

157.
Identical Letters dated 3 January 1997 from the Permanent Representative
of Turkey, supra note 152. Turkey further argued that the terrorist attacks constituted
a threat to regional peace and security. Identical Letters dated 16 July 1997 from
Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey, supra note 152.
158.
Identical Letters dated 3 January 1997 from the Permanent Representative
of Turkey, supra note 152.
159.
See Uncorrected Transcript of Belgium's Oral Pleadings, supra note 81.
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referring to Draft Article 33, Belgium offered the following, different
definition of necessity: A state of necessity is the cause which justifies
the violation of a binding rule in order to safeguard, in face of grave
and imminent danger, values which are higher than those protected
160
by the rule which has been breached.
Belgium alluded briefly to the balancing of interests: "What rule
has been breached? We do not accept that any rule has been
breached. However, for the sake of argument, let us say that it is the
rule prohibiting the use of force." Subsequently, the question was
asked: "What are the higher values which this intervention attempts
to safeguard? They are rights of jus cogens, It is the collective security
of an entire region." Later the Belgian representative added: "The
Court is dealing with an intervention to save an entire population in
peril, a population which is the victim of severe, widespread
violations of its rights, rights which have the status of a norm of jus
61
cogen."'1
It should be pointed out that Belgium's reply was given in the
context of a hearing about preliminary measures. Yugoslavia
delivered applications against ten NATO member states to the court
and only Belgium and the United Kingdom, in part, addressed the
substantive law underlying the dispute during the hearings
concerning preliminary measures. Belgium, however, neither
addressed the modalities and cumulative conditions of necessity nor
related to the complicated question of use of force under necessity,
including Ago's differentiation. At the present time, it is unknown
whether the court will rule on the merits. On March 16, 2004, the
court announced public hearings to take place between April 19 and
23. The purpose of the scheduled hearings is to hear the parties' oral
16 2
statements on the preliminary objections.
C. Necessity and Terrorism
When addressing various aspects of the issue of terrorism in the
21st century, it appears both sensible and necessary to distinguish
between what might be termed "traditional" terrorism, the terrorism
known to the world from the 1970s through the 1990s, and what has
variously been termed "the new terrorism" or "megaterrorism.' 163
Whatever the designation, this new terrorism is recognizable by the

160.
See id.
161.
See id.
162.
I.C.J. Press Release, Legality of Use of Force (Mar. 16, 2004), available at
http://212.153.43.18icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2OO4/ipresscom2004.13-yall20040316.
htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004).
163.
See generally THE NEW TERRORISM: ANATOMY, TRENDS AND COUNTERSTRATEGIES (Andrew Tan & Kumar Ramakrishna eds., 2002); RICHARD FALK, THE
GREAT TERROR WAR (2003).
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mass destruction/disruption

of

This distinction is particularly prudent

when reviewing the legal literature from the late twentieth century,
which when dealing with terrorism, in most cases, did not consider
mass casualty terrorism.
1. "Traditional" Terrorism and Necessity
In his 1991 book International Law in Theory and Practice,
based on his Hague Academy Lectures, Oscar Schachter discussed
the options for using force against terrorists. 164 For the most part,
these were thoughts developed after the Hague Lectures in 1982.165
He first analyzed self-defense as legitimization for using force against
terrorists but found that the legal limits of self-defense may preclude
the use of force in some cases, particularly where the host state is not
substantially involved and, second, where the terrorist attack has not
yet taken place but involves a grave threat. 166 Based on this,
Schachter queried whether a state injured or threatened by terrorist
attacks can use force.
When considering necessity in this context, which is Schachter's
purpose, one may wonder how a state already injured by an attack
can consider the state of necessity. As pointed out above, necessity
addresses a situation of "grave and imminent" danger to an essential
interest. Hence, necessity cannot be invoked by an injured state, i.e.,
after the danger has materialized. The explanation is to be found in
Schachter's assumption that the terrorist attack form part of a
pattern of attacks. 16 7 The question is whether the necessity excuse

164.
165.

SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 162-73.
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against

Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 309 (1989).
166.
SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 169.

167.
Id. at 164. Some, however, have disputed Schachter's conclusion in this
regard. Dinstein develops quite an expansive notion of self-defense, originally
consisting of four categories. The third dealt with the cases where "the employment of
force within the territory of another state directed against individuals in retribution for
acts committed by them-on their own responsibility-without the complicity of the
government concerned." Yoram Dinstein, A Survey of Self-Defense in International
Law, in CHARLES S. THOMAS, A TREATIES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME I,
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 273, 279 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1973). "The terrorist raids
continue to be armed attacks-even if conducted from, and not by, another State [and]
self-defence is permitted inside the territory of another State . . . against the guilty
terrorists rather than the ineffective local government." Yoram Dinstein, Terrorism
and Wars of Liberation Applied to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Israeli Perspective, 3
ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 78, 90 (1973). Dinstein further argues that "[a] government that
is unable to repel terrorists must not try to display unwanted powers when the victim

implements the law." Id. at 91. Although he acknowledges that this scenario
occasionally is called "necessity," he preferred the designation "execution." Id. Dinstein
found and finds that "the distinction between self-defence and necessity . . . is
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provides a vehicle for dealing with such terrorist attacks that form
part of a pattern.
The first question is whether a terrorist attack would threaten an
essential interest. Schachter argued terrorist acts which "take lives,
disrupt internal order or interfere with essential services" would
qualify as threats to essential interests. 16 8 As noted above, it would
appear difficult to challenge a state's assertion, within reasonable
limits, that a certain act or omission threatens its essential interests.
If this is accepted, the central condition under Article 25 would
be the gravity of the threat to the essential interest. Indeed, a
national interest may arguably become essential if the threat is grave
enough. This is in harmony with Schachter's assumption the terrorist
attacks in question are "sufficiently grave to jeopardize the essential
interest of the State in protecting its citizens and political order."'16 9
Furthermore, according to Schachter, the threat would have to go
beyond "acts of a sporadic character that cause occasional harm and
inconvenience. ' 170 Terrorist attacks such as those which took place on
September 11 or attacks involving some form of a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) would doubtlessly reach the required level. In
addition, it may be argued that the accumulation of a series of attacks
also might be one way of reaching a sufficient level of seriousness.
This is in agreement with Schachter's assumption of "a pattern of
attacks." Against this observation, one may inquire whether, based on
principled considerations, an emergency response such as necessity is
correct or adequate for a systematic problem.

artificial.... the use of cross-border counter-force against armed bands is historically
tied to the subject of self-defence, and there is no reason to cut that umbilical cord."
DINSTEIN, supra note 154, at 217. Schachter, responding to an earlier edition of
Dinstein's book containing the same argument, answers that the umbilical cord "has
already been cut by two international legal bodies-the International Court and the
International Law Commission." SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 172. He has, however,
changed the title of the sub-category of self-defense which encompasses this situation
to "extra-territorial law enforcement." DINSTEIN, supra note 154, at 213-21. Along
similar lines, Murphy argues that "there is nothing in Article 51 ... that requires the
exercise of self-defense to turn on whether an armed attack was committed directly by
another state." Sean Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of 'Armed Attack" in Article
51 of the U.N. Charter,43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41, 50 (2002). Gaja, however, asserts that
such a "condition may be taken as implicit." Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense Was There an
'Armed Attack'?, available at http://www.ejil.org/forum-WTC/ny-gaja.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2002); see also Position Paper of Australian Section of the International
Commission of Jurists on the Appropriate Response of the UN to the Attacks on the
USA, available at http://www.ejil.org/forum-WTC/messages/17.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2002) ("It is clear that where another state ... provides bases or refuge for the
attackers, the state under attack, or threat of attack, may use armed force against that
other State in exercise of the right of self defence.").
168.
SCHACHTER, supranote 4, at 170.
169.
Id.
170.
Id. at 171.
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As it turns out, there appear to be several structural problems
connected to the application of the necessity excuse to a systematic
problem, such as a pattern of attacks. The whole discourse about
patterns of attacks is reminiscent of similar arguments in the context
of self-defense, the accumulation of events theory according to which
several "small" attacks which each in their own right would not
amount to an "armed attack" under Article 51, can, nevertheless, be
treated as an armed attack when taken together. As pointed out by
Gray, the ICJ does not appear to have dismissed the theory out of
hand. 171 Hence, a pattern of attacks may arguably add up to an
armed attack under certain conditions. In the case of necessity, the
grave and imminent danger, which may trigger the invocation of the
necessity excuse, would not seem to be the function of a possible
previous series of attacks. The necessity response is an emergency
response to deal with the immediate grave peril at hand, not the five
previous attacks during the past six months in addition to the
imminent attack. That the state considering invoking the state of
necessity has been the victim of previous attacks would not seem to
add anything towards fulfilling the cumulative conditions in Article
25.
The fact that Schachter based his discussion on the occurrence of
several or a pattern of terrorist attacks indicates that the problem is
systemic, which causes further problem in regard to the necessity
excuse. As international law has developed, particularly through the
twentieth century, an increasing range of issues and problems are
now regulated by international law, be it customary or conventional.
Rodick informed us that some questions concerning extraterritorial
jurisdiction once were legitimated by necessity: "The plea of necessity
has also been employed to excuse the action of a state in assuming
criminal jurisdiction over aliens in respect to acts not committed
within its territory." Rodick mentioned "counterfeiting of currency,
plotting against its ruler," and "Russia, Greece and Mexico [have]
gone even further and declared that circumstances of exceptional
necessity will excuse the action of a state in providing for the
punishment of serious extraterritorial offences against their
subjects." These bases for jurisdiction are today known as the
protective or security principle and the passive personality principle
respectively. 1 72 Ago, too, provided an example of how a situation
originally dealt with under necessity today is explicitly regulated:

CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 108 (2000).
171.
IN
NECESSITY
OF
THE DOCTRINE
RODICK,
CUSHING
BURLEIGH
172.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (1928). See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL LAW 303-04 (4th ed. 1990).
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The lesson of the Torrey Canyon incident did not go unheeded. In view
of the fact that such incidents might recur at any time, it seemed
essential to ground the right of the coastal State to take protective
measures on positive rules which would be more precise than the mere
possibility of relying on a "state of necessity" as a circumstance
precluding the international wrongfulness of certain measures taken on
173
the high seas.

International security and the use of force are regulated under
the U.N. Charter. It has often been argued that the inoperability or
poor functioning of the collective security system grants greater
authority for states to use force than was is allowed under the
Charter rules. Such arguments have, however, been refuted by the
ICJ. In this context, one may also quote the following excerpt from
ICJ President Winiarski's dissenting opinion:
The intention of those who drafted it was clearly to abandon the
possibility of useful action rather than to sacrifice the balance of
carefully established fields of competence, as can be seen, for example,
in the case of the voting in the Security Council. It is only by such
procedures, which were clearly defined, that the United Nations can
seek to achieve its purposes. It may be that the United Nations is
sometimes not in a position to undertake action which would be useful
for the maintenance of international peace and security or for one or
another of the purposes indicated in Article 1 of the Charter, but that is
the way in which the Organization was conceived and brought into
being.174

The perceived problems pertaining in particular to the functioning of
the Security Council were again raised in the context of the Kosovo
crisis and, albeit in a different form, in the recent case of Iraq. As
recently pointed out by Crawford and the ILC, the state of necessity
excuse cannot be invoked as a source of authority; it does not provide
an adequate framework for authorizing the use of force for example in
the context of humanitarian intervention. A similar conclusion must
apply to potential use of force against terrorism. As pointed out
above, however, the state of necessity may provide an ad hoc excuse,
as opposed to a source of authority, for exceptional threats to
essential interests. A systematic problem concerning a pattern of
attacks would, however, appear to be at odds with this function of the
necessity excuse.
2. "New" Terrorism and Necessity
Although the so-called "new" terrorism does not by definition
involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a scenario involving
such weapons is often what comes to mind. As pointed out initially in

173.
Addendum to Eighth Report, supra note 24, 36, at 29.
174.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 230 (July 20)
(dissenting opinion of President Winiarski).
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this Article, the U.S. Administration's interpretation of self-defense,
which includes preemptive attacks on terrorists, lacks support in
current international law. In lieu of a reasonable self-defense
argument, the necessity excuse may provide a legal basis for a
forceful response to a single imminent attack against a large number
of people. Romano has advocated the potential use of the doctrine of
necessity in case of use of force against such threats. 175 Depending on
the circumstances and assuming that the use of force is not
completely ruled out under Article 25, the cumulative conditions
would appear fulfilled if a real and immediate threat of deployment of
WMD could be established. There would certainly be a grave peril to
an essential interest and balancing of interests would also come out
on the side of the state threatened by a WMD attack.
A hypothetical legal advisor from the U.S. State Department
might, however, encounter problems when attempting to fit a
preemptive strike under the necessity excuse. As in the case of selfdefense, the question of imminency remains central. Article 25 speaks
of a "grave and imminent peril." As mentioned, the ICJ has
determined that the peril has to be established "at the relevant point
in time" and, hence, not be a mere "possibility."'176 If, however, the
realization of the peril is certain and inevitable, the peril may still be
said to be imminent even if the realization will only come about in the
long term. 17 7 Similarly, the 2001 Commentary explains that "a
measure of uncertainty about the future does not necessarily
disqualify a state from invoking necessity, if the peril is clearly
established on the basis of the evidence reasonably available at the
time."17 8 As pointed out by both the ICJ and the ILC, long-term
predictions and prognoses are particularly pertinent to questions
concerning threats to, for example, the environment. 179 As outlined
above, the court implicitly employed the precautionary principle in
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case.
However, as observed by Bothe in the context of self-defense,
transferring the precautionary principle to the field of legitimization
of the use of force provides for a "weird" conclusion: "in case of

175.
John-Alex Romano, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of a State of Necessity, 87 GEo. L.J. 1023, 1025
(1999).
176.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 42, 54.
177.
Id. In the concrete case, the court found that although an "essential
interest," i.e. the environment was involved, the threat was in the case of Nagymaros
neither grave nor imminent, id. at 42, 55, and in the case of the Gabcikovo sector not
imminent, its graveness untold, id. at 42-43,
56-57.
178.
CRAWFORD, supra note 27, 16, at 184.
179.
Id.
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uncertainty, strike."1 8 0 This reading of how the precautionary
principle might function in the legal regime regulating the use of
force may be too mordant.
One might ask whether the legal concept of imminence might be
adjusted. The NSS document may be seen to anticipate the problems
arising vis & vis international law and proposes that "[wie must adapt
the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
today's adversaries."'' This proposal is based on the assertion that if
and when an attack by terrorists or a rogue state employing WMD
becomes imminent in the conventional sense, it is too late to react.
This proposal is not prima facie unreasonable even if the exact legal
modalities and practical implications have to be studied and debated.
However, lex lata the bottom line is that a preemptive attack as
envisioned by the NSS and other documents goes beyond the bounds
of the necessity excuse. If the imminence requirement were fulfilled,
however, the necessity excuse would appear to be suitable as a legal
excuse for using force against terrorists attempting to deploy WMD.

VI. CONCLUSION

That a state of necessity under certain circumstances may be
invoked in order to preclude wrongfulness of breaching an
international obligation is undoubtedly part of contemporary
international law. The justification is, however, reserved for
extraordinary cases, something the ILC in part emphasized by
deliberately phasing the provision in Article 25 of the Draft Articles
on state responsibility in the negative.
When considering whether the necessity excuse can be invoked
in case of use of force against terrorists, several complications arise:
first, whether force can be employed with reference to necessity. Ago
and the ILC found, in 1980, that limited uses of force probably were
not prohibited by a peremptory norm and, hence, compatible with the
necessity excuse. Indications are that today, all use of force is
prohibited by a jus cogens norm, although this is not entirely clear.
The terrorist threat would, next, have to fulfill the cumulative
conditions in Draft Article 25. One problem, which has not been
addressed, is the balancing of interests where the interest behind the
obligation breach must "obviously be inferior to" the interest of the
state invoking necessity. One may argue that the essential interest
under threat must be very substantial indeed in order to outweigh
the use of force against another state.
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Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-emptive Force, 14 EUR. J.
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However, in order for the threat to reach the required level of
seriousness, one may have to anticipate systemic threats, such as a
pattern of terrorist attacks as proposed by Schachter. To address a
systemic problem with an ad hoc response, however, causes
difficulties both concerning the specific conditions and more general
principled considerations. Conceptually, to respond to a systemic
threat with an exceptional ad hoc response, such as the necessity
excuse, in many ways appears to be an oxymoron. In sum, it would
seem that, even if force is not excluded under the necessity excuse,
conventional terrorism cannot be addressed under the state of
necessity.
This leaves the issue of unconventional terrorism with a single
massive attack against a large number of victims. Again assuming
that the use of force is not ruled out as a given, a threatened terrorist
attack employing unconventional weapons would appear to fulfill the
cumulative conditions for resorting to the necessity excuse. The idea
of preemptive attacks as presented in the NSS document would,
however, go beyond what might be excused by reference to necessity.

